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In the aftermath of the United States Presidential election, more and more frequently there are 
calls for voters to be able to place their votes from the comfort of their own home. However, 
many studies have found prototype systems to be either insecure or insufficiently defined for the 
purposes of an election on a national scale.  
 
In this paper I will examine the security of voting applications from a different angle: the 
validation and verification of compiled code. There are the obvious concerns about unverified 
code, that we have no guarantee the protocol described by the voting procedure is the one 
being executed. Using work by Appel [3] as a model, it can be seen that even advanced 
cryptographic algorithms can be verified. Using Chaum’s scheme, a visual cryptography system 
intensely examined in Staub’s work [1], and originally described in Chaum’s paper [5], as our 
target enables us to have a secure algorithm that we can properly verify. Our goal will be to 
establish a verified code implementation for Chaum’s scheme that could be deployed to voters 
to confirm their votes.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years about the security of current voting 
procedures and how we can both increase security and public confidence in our election 
processes. These concerns have led to a number of potential voting systems to be proposed 
that would cover those concerns, normally involving a series of cryptographic procedures that 
would provide the qualities needed for votes to be processed securely.  
 
A voter needs to be assured that those in charge of processing the election tally cannot 
determine who they voted for, while also being able to know that their vote will be processed 
correctly. The scheme we’ve chosen to study is Chaum’s scheme, which utilizes visual 
cryptography to provide these guarantees to voters. However, the changes that switching to 
Chaum’s scheme would create in the voting process would be likely to generate distrust and 
concern among the general public. With public confidence and trust in the process being 
important factors in the successful completion of an election process, providing additional 
assurances to voters that their votes are acting just as they had before.  
 
With this in mind we can look towards formal verification methods to produce programs that 
have a guarantee of their execution behavior provided with them. One of these in particular is 
the Verified Software Toolchain, a connection of a certified C compiler with a proof script written 
in the Coq proof language. This takes a C program and a series of written proofs regarding the 
6 
behavior of the functions and commands within the program to as close to a guarantee of 
execution behavior as we can get for now.  
 
With this in mind, we can apply the processes described in the Verified Software Toolchain to 
portions of Chaum’s scheme to provide voters with a reassurance that despite the changes their 
votes are processed just the same as before. This is the thrust of this paper, to provide a formal 
verification of the vote validation process within Chaum’s Scheme. Chapter two will provide a 
detailed background on both Chaum’s Scheme and the Verified Software Toolchain, including a 
demonstrative proof of a simpler program, with chapter three providing the formally stated thesis 
description along with a description of the C language source code of our program. Chapter four 
will provide a description of the difficulties encountered during the process of proving our goal, 
and then chapter five explains some design decisions along with a group of future work that 
would help further the value of the proofs within this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2: Background 
2.1 Chaum’s Scheme 
 
First we should establish some terminology regarding modern voting technologies: Internet 
voting is the use of an online portal or forms to cast a vote in an election, whereas e-voting or 
electronic voting is the use of any electronic process, be it an online technology or the booths 
used at many polling stations today.  
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As democracy expands and voters’ lives become progressively more busy, countries are looking 
for methods to make it easier than ever to vote in their important elections. Many have called 
upon governments to build a method to vote via the Internet [12], or expand current e-voting 
procedures. Meanwhile security experts continue to cite a lack of transparency in e-voting 
machines’ code as a continuing and growing security risk [8,9], and many have warned heavily 
against the idea of online voting, saying it is too insecure and the stakes are too high for failure 
[10].  
 
Source code of electronic voting machines is considered proprietary by many companies, 
making it impossible for individuals and experts to properly certify the back-end code. This is 
inherently dangerous in national voting schemes, as there is no way for outside third parties to 
be certain that no changes or modifications to votes are taking place, placing the credibility of 
such elections in doubt [9]. While there has yet to be a proven case of fraud using e-voting 
machines (also known as Direct Record Electronic machines, or DRE machines), the potential 
exists in systems without proven cryptographic security [11].  
 
Proposed primarily for e-voting procedures, Chaum’s scheme as specified in his original paper 
[5] and described in a detailed analysis of it in Staub’s work [1] is a potential way of putting to 
rest some of the security concerns with e-voting machines. First and foremost, the algorithm is 
public, enabling security and cryptography experts to analyze the process and confirm that it is 
in fact secure. Additionally, it has an easily implemented verification section that allows voters to 
quickly check that their vote has been properly cast and not modified or corrupted. While each 
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individual voter only has a fifty percent chance of detecting fraud, they can be nearly certain on 
a national scale that the votes are being cast correctly due to sheer mathematical probability.  
 
Chaum’s scheme is an electronic voting procedure based on visual cryptography [13, 15]. 
Visual cryptography is formed as follows: two different bit images for 0 and 1 are formed (see 
below) [13, 5]. These bit images are combined together to form a layer, which when combined 
with another layer can form an actual image, see generated example below (code from Stajano 
[14]).  
 
Each two by two bit image is represented in the final image, with an all black square being the 
overlay of two different bit images, and a square with white on it is an overlay of two of the same 
bit image. Each layer of bit images is random noise to anyone without the other layer, only once 
combined do the layers hold any value, with this noise being generated in a process described 
in 2.1.1.  
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On a high level, Chaum’s scheme allows a user to vote using this process. A user selects a 
desired series of votes, which are then turned into layers of bit images that combined form an 
image holding those votes. Each layer 
is then encrypted and, combined with 
other information, placed into a ​receipt 
which holds that information that is 
then put online to be tallied as well as 
printed for a user to take home. A 
central committee then decrypts the 
layers and uses them to produce the 
final ballots, and with those, the total 
vote count.  
 
Let us dig deeper into that high level description of what makes Chaum’s scheme an effective 
way to cast ballots in an election. All election schemes require three important properties, 
anonymity, integrity, and coercion immunity [16, 9]. Anonymity specifies that it is impossible for 
anyone to determine how another person voted, integrity specifies that a person’s vote must be 
counted the way it is cast, and lastly coercion immunity specifies that it is impossible for a voter 
to prove who they voted for to anyone else.  
 
Chaum’s scheme provides this with a receipt system that holds information which when properly 
manipulated provides coercion immunity and (statistical) integrity, along with a distributed tally 
process that protects anonymity. Through manipulation of information provided on the receipt as 
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described below, along with the manner in which ​trustees​ (individuals entrusted with parts of the 
decryption process) do their work, all three conditions are met.  
 
With that in mind, let’s now go through a description of the scheme step by step, ignoring some 
specifics that we will comment on afterwards. The first step is a voter selecting their list of vote 
choices on a ballot, including write-ins or other election-specific options, just as they might on a 
current machine. From there, the machine prints out the beginning of a receipt, where the 
receipt is a set of aligned graphics on the top and bottom of a separable page. An example of 
this sort of split is shown above, with the letter “e” being split into two layers that look simply like 
random noise. All letters would be similarly constructed for the purposes of the receipt, forming 
a total image.  
 
After this initial portion is printed, the voter selects which part of the receipt they want, and which 
part of the receipt is to be eliminated. Once the layer has been chosen, the printer prints the 
remaining portions of the receipt (which describes instructions of what to do with each layer of 
the receipt).  The ordering here is crucial for the integrity of the algorithm: if a voter were to 
select the chosen layer prior to printing, the machine could “cheat” here, knowing that the voter 
would have no way to verify the layer they did not choose. Therefore it could freely manipulate 
the layer, changing votes at will.  
 
A voter can now leave the polling station with their chosen receipt, as it is a grid of the bit 
symbols shown above, and is in effect a one-time pad acting as the key for the discarded layer 
which now only exists as an encrypted electronic version to be sent to the official counting 
location. This receipt can be shown to anyone, in any manner, and all that a viewer would be 
11 
able to determine is whether the ballot is authentic and legitimate, and not who the vote was for, 
thus providing coercion immunity. The process for verifying a receipt is described, coded, and 
the code formally verified throughout this thesis. Additionally, this receipt can be checked 
against an official website via serial number and checked for accuracy. Further, the website will 
post a batch of all receipts to be processed, along with the the output of a cryptographic 
signature taken on the receipts. This can be compared with the results to ensure the same 
number of items is in each of the posted batch and the result set. Through open-source 
programs and releases of intermediate batches, any person or group can verify the receipts 
posted as the input receipt batch do correspond to an (unknown) receipt in the tally batch.  
 
An important question here is how these receipts work, and what properties they give each vote 
they contain. Any receipt posted online will be included in the tally and cannot be decoded 
without the keys of the distributed trustees. More importantly, even an attacker with infinite 
computing power and access to every election computer in an election could only modify each 
vote in three manners: printing an incorrect layer, repeating serial numbers, or cheating in the 
tally process. Due to the manner the election is counted, each of these attacks has only a fifty 
percent chance of succeeding per modified ballot. Changing a mere twenty ballots has a smaller 
chance of evading detection than one in one million, with the odds scaling exponentially worse 
and worse for the attackers. This provides integrity through sheer volume - the odds of an 
attacker being able to flip enough votes to sway an election are incredibly, nearly impossibly 
low, making the process secure.  
 
The details of constructing the layers will be described below, but let it suffice for now that we 
build them such that when overlaid they produce the desired ballot image, and both appear to 
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be (and are)completely random. We then have two layers that are noise, with each acting as a 
one-time pad of sorts for the other, with only the election trustees having a way to recreate the 
ballot image from a single receipt layer. A more formal description of this is available in both 
Staub’s [1] and Chaum’s [5] work. Is it possible for the receipt layer to encode different choices 
than the voter sees on their printout? Only if a single layer has been falsified - if both were 
changed, then the voter would be able to see the fraud immediately. If just one layer was 
changed, then each instance of a changed ballot would have, as mentioned before, a fifty 
percent chance of being caught and shown.  
 
Next we must determine how to get from this set of receipts to a set of final images. The election 
has a number of trustees, ideally who have either no stake in the election or opposing stakes, 
and so are highly incentivized to keep the others honest in their roles. On the receipt there is a 
set of information described below that holds the information on how the votes are to be 
recovered: a set of two data structures (which can be thought of simply as int arrays), termed 
dolls​, that are in fact just encrypted versions of each of the layers. The layers are passed 
through repeated rounds of encryption, one for each trustee, where a public key corresponding 
to that trustee is used to encrypt the layer. Once the encryption process is complete, the dolls 
on our receipt are created. To tally the final vote, trustees apply their private decryption keys in 
sequence to recover both layers and with the layers the ballot image corresponding to each 
vote. There are once again details that help ensure the integrity and anonymity of each 
individual vote within the precise scheme, but for our purposes this description will do.  
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2.1.1 Receipt Generation 
 
There are still some important details for Chaum’s scheme to cover for a full understanding of 
how it all comes together, so we will cover that now. We need to look in depth at the 
mathematics and process of how layers are constructed, how receipts are constructed, and 
lastly how receipts are verified, which will be a bit further below in its own section.  
 
We can begin with how layers are constructed. We already know that the layers, when 
overlapped and aligned properly, should produce the desired ballot image selected by the voter. 
Additionally, we know that each of the two layers should appear to be random bits to any user 
without the other corresponding layer. At the same time, we do need a somewhat deterministic 
method to generate these layers so that our deterministic machines are capable of making the 
layers quickly without having to sample atmospheric noise or something similar.  
 
So how do we generate our pseudorandom bits? We will 
use a small 4x2 ballot section to illustrate the process, 
shown here, with the image converted to a ballot matrix. 
From there we split the Ballot into two matrices ​t​B ​and ​b​B​, 
by ​checkerboarding​ the ballot as seen on a game board 
(presented below). This generates 
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t​B = ​(0100) and ​b​B = ​(0010) for our example. 
 
 
The next step is important for all parts of the receipt - layers, dolls, and verification, and involves 
some additional requirements - a known number of trustees that corresponds to the number of 
rounds of encryptions/decryptions, along with a pair of hash functions that output a value of the 
same length as half the number of values in the ballot matrices and a signature function with 
known public keys for both the top and bottom layers. For our example, we will use four rounds 
of trustees for both creation and verification. The next step is then as follows - generate four 
variables for both the top and bottom layers, where a first hash function ​h​1​ takes the signed 
serial number of the receipt using the respective layer along with the number of the current 
trustee (for us, a value between one and four inclusive). Formally, for each  ​in  and forl 1 ≤ l ≤ 4  
, , with representing signing the serial number ​q​ with the public key or bx = t d  h (s (q), l) x ′l =  1 x  sx  
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x ​(which is a distinct integer array for both top and bottom). These ​d’​ variables will be used later 
to construct the dolls, used in recreating the unknown layer, as well as in confirming the dolls 
were formed properly while verifying the receipt, see below.  
 
We then take each of these ​d’​ variables and input them into the second hash function ​h​2​. This 
gives an equal sized set of variables ​d​ defined as follows: for each  ​in  and forl 1 ≤ l ≤ 4  
. We will form the ballot image using two sets of paired binary strings, ​t​W​, or bx = t h ( d ) dx l =  2
x ′l  
b​W, ​t​R, ​and ​b​R​. These strings will be checkerboarded as seen below into each ballot layer. From 
here we form our first layer as follows: and , forming the top and bottomW  ⊕ d t =  t l W  ⊕ d 
b =  b l  
layers by ​xor​’ing our generated variables together into a single bit string. We define this output 
as follows for our example, since we have no particular hash or signature function that we are 
particularly specified on: and . This only provides half the picture,W  (0111) t =  W  (0010) b =   
and we need to chose another set of values such that when overlaid with our generated set of 
values will produce the desired ballot image. Since the overlay acts as an ​xor​ function, we form 
the other set of binary strings ​b​R​ and ​t​R​ as follows: and . For thisR W  ⊕ B t =  b  t R W  ⊕ B b =  t  b  
example, this gives us  and .R (0010) 0100) (0110) t =  ⊕ ( =  R (0111) 0010) (0101) b =  ⊕ ( =    
 
There is one last step to take to turn our bit strings into layers, which is to build each final layer 
partially from the generated bits and partially from the required bits. This is done, as described 
earlier, by ​checkerboarding​ the two layers, in a pattern seen below. With the checkerboarding 
complete, we have our two layers determined and ready to be passed onto the next stage of 




Next we should describe how the dolls (encrypted layers, so called because each layer of a doll 
reveals another level of encryption within) are formed. We begin with our variables from the d′  
layer construction, and an encryption function with public keys for each trustee in the process. 
We then form the final doll as follows: encrypt each successive variable using a trustee’s key d′  
along with the results of each prior encryption, which formally looks like this for both the top and 
bottom layers:  
and .oll (d ); Doll (d , Doll );D 1 = e1 ′1  2 = e2 ′2  1 oll (d , Doll );D 3 = e3 ′3  2 oll (d , Doll ) ollD 4 = e4 ′4  3 = D   
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Put together, we have  
andDoll ( d , e ( d , ( d , e ( d ))))  t = e4
t ′4  3
t ′3 e2
t ′2  1
t ′1  
.Doll ( d , e ( d , ( d , e ( d )))) b = e4
b ′4  3
b ′3 e2
b ′2  1
b ′1   
Later, during the decryption and tally process, the layers of encryption will be stripped off one at 
a time, revealing each of these ​d’​ variables. Those will be used to recreate the missing ​W​ layer, 
and with that in hand half of the bits used in the final image. While this may seem insufficient for 
forming the final image, we do know approximately what the final images may look like on large 
images with a defined alphabet of characters. Therefore it is possible to take a very accurate 
guess as to what the final ballot image is supposed to be.  
2.1.2 Receipt Verification 
Let us begin with a table of notation, in order to help provide context to the precise process of 
verification. For those unfamiliar with it, Coq is a formal proof management system used to 
complete our full proof and will be further described later on.  
 
Variable C-Type Coq Type Description Accessibility 
m int Int Rows of bit 
images in image 
Public 
n int Int Columns of bit 
images in image 
Public 
x (none) (none) Denotes top or 
bottom 
Public 
D​x Int array (​m by n) List Z Doll (encrypted 
seeds) 
Both top and 
bottom Public 
I, j Int array (​m by n) List Z Member of singed 
tuple 
Public 
q Int Int Serial Number Public 




v Int Int Potentially signed 
serial number 
Public 
w Int Int Member of signed 
tuple 
Public 
L​x Int array (​m by n) List Z Layer of image One public, one 
destroyed 
k Int array (​m by n) List Z Member of signed 
tuple 
Public 
t​x​(); ​x​ is layer key Int -> int -> int Int -> Int -> Int Signature function Private 
s​-1​() Int -> int -> int Int -> Int -> Int Inverse signature 
function 
Public 
p​x ​(); ​x​ is layer key Int array -> int -> 
int array 
List Z -> int -> 
List Z 
Signature function Private 
o​-1 ​() Int array -> int -> 
int array 





l int Int Trustee identifier, 
encryption key 
Public 
e​l​()​; ​l ​is trustee 
key 
Int array -> int -> 
int array 





h() Int -> int -> int Int -> Int -> Int Hash function Public 
x​d’ Bit array (​length
)/2m * n  
List Z Layer components Private 
x​W Bit array (​length
)/2m * n  
List Z Layer bits Private 
x​R Bit array (​length
)/2m * n  
List Z Layer bits Private 
 
The final receipt that an individual will have to verify will be an int array with the following 
information in it (with ​x ​being either the top or bottom layer, and the corresponding key when 
seen next to a function):  
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L​x​, ​q​, ​D​t​, ​D​b​, ​v​, and a tuple of ​(k, r, i, j, w) ​with ​v ​being the output of ​t​x​(​q​) and the tuple 
being , with each value being as described in(L ); (q); (D ); j (D ); (v)k = px
x r = px i = px
t  = px
b w = px  
the table above. 
 
To summarize, we have the encrypted versions of both layers, the decrypted version of one, a 
serial number, and a set of six values (one by itself and the other five grouped) that have had 
some operation done to them by the machine, which we hope to be the signature function using 
the correct signature keys for their layer. Other known information is the encryption function 
each trustee uses, and the public key used with that encryption function. For simplicity, let us 
assume that there are four trustees, and each of them uses the same encryption function, and 
the subscript on the function will simply represent the encryption key. Additionally, the inverse 
signature functions are both available, along with their inverse signature keys for both layers.  
 
Knowing all of this, a voter can then verify their receipt by checking three facts:  
 
1. Take the inverse signature of the signed serial number and confirm that it matches - that 
is,  ​The function ​s​-1​ is a public function (with a public inverse signature key for(v).q = sx−1  
each layer) that has been stated by those running the election to properly de-sign serial 
numbers. The value ​v ​is the output of the signature function (hopefully for which the 
published ​s​-1​ is in fact an inverse), and which we hope is equivalent to , which(q)sx  
would make our stated goal a tautology.  
2. Take the inverse signature of the tuple ​(k, r, i, j, w)​ with the second public designing 
function ​o​-1​ and confirm the values match the corresponding unsigned values in the 
tuple. Using the previous notation, 
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. Once again, if (k); q (r); D (i); D (j); and  v (w)Lx = o−1x  = o−1x  t = o−1x  b = o−1x  = o−1x px = ox
for which  ​is an inverse then all of these equations reduce to tautologies and weo−1x  
have proven our voting machine to be using the correct signing procedures (and as such 
the machine is genuine).  
3. Compute the hash values of the signed serial number and index for each key that exists. 
Then, encrypt the values using the public encryption keys in the same order the indices 
were applied (key one on hash one, key two on hash two and the first encrypted value, 
key three on hash three and the second encrypted value and so on), and compare the 
final value to the value of the doll listed on the receipt and confirm that they match. 
These hash values are the same as those computed in the first step of generating the 
layers. In notation assuming four trustees as above - 
a.  for each trustee ​l​. Each of these variables is a bit string whichd  h (v, l) x ′l =  1   
has length equal to the number of pixels in the image (length times width) divided 
by two, which may exceed the size of a standard int, in which case they become 
an integer array.  
b. D​x​ = ​e​4​(​X​d’​4  ​, ​e​3​(​X​d’​3  ​, ​e​2​(​X​d’​2  ​, ​e​1​(​X​d’​1​)))). Each encryption function outputs an 
integer array to pass to the next function along with each of the trustees variable 
integer arrays, and the final one should match the doll of the layer we have kept. 
 
The last check confirms that the doll (and thus the vote) was formed correctly. This verification 
process is what will be written and formally verified in this thesis, using the Verified Software 
Toolchain, described below. This gives the general flow of Chaum’s scheme for voter-verifiable 
elections. For more details see either Chaum’s original paper [5] or a thorough examination of it 
by Staub[1].  
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2.2 Verified Software Toolchain (VST) 
As much as high level programming has abstracted away many of the unspecified behaviors 
and difficulties of the past, there are times when either the raw performance or the ability to 
write precise code dictates the way we program. And even in high-level languages, compiler 
bugs and imperfect implementations can create strange edge cases that may never fully be 
squashed out. As a result, we need a method to guarantee the behavior we intended is the 
behavior that happens. The Verified Software Toolchain is one option for it [2], proof-carrying 
code is another [17]. 
 
The solution to this for high priority systems is a process of formal verification, where users of a 
program can be absolutely certain via formalized logic and proven compilers that the code they 
wrote does precisely what they anticipate. In his original paper in 2011 [2], Appel describes 
precisely just a process, the Verified Software Toolchain (VST), whereby through a series of 
proofs, a programmer or team of programmers can verify their program.  
 
Let us quickly cover some basics needed for the VST to work. Coq, as mentioned before, is a 
formal proof assistant where users specify ​.v​ files that hold proof instructions called ​tactics​ that 
are sequentially executed to prove theorems and lemmas in a constructive logic environment. 
For those unfamiliar, the online guide Software Foundations by Pierce, et. al. [7] is an excellent 
start up guide on the basic workings of Coq. CompCert is a project to make a verified C 
compiler, that guarantees the same behavior between the C code and their compiled versions.  
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With that in mind, what is the Verified Software Toolchain? It is a series of formally verified 
transformations from high level language down to executable machine code. We start by simply 
writing a C program as for any other coding project. Then we convert the c file into a Coq .v file, 
which we then write a verification of in Coq. The verification in Coq of the program acts as our 
formal proof that it functions as we expect, and the CompCert compiler semantically preserves 
the meaning of the programs.  
 
The first step to the VST proof is formally defining a functional specification of the chosen task 
within Coq, since without that the program cannot have a formal behavior. Once established, we 
can use Coq libraries provided with VST along with standard Coq tactics to prove that the 
converted C code has the same behavior as the defined specifications. By defining pre- and 
post-conditions along with function definitions, we can also easily split the proof into specific 
concerns rather than a single large proof.  
 
An important part of the VST is the CompCert compiler by Leroy, which enables the step 
between high-level code and machine code to be certified. The CompCert compiler for CLight 
provides a formally proven compiler where the input program is guaranteed to have the same 
behavior as the machine code output, verified using the Coq proof assistant again. For VST, 
what this means is that if we can prove that the code has a specific behavior (as we prove in our 
own Coq .v files), then the compiled code from the CompCert compiler will also have that 
behavior. This behavior includes type checking, memory assignment, and bounds checking.  
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2.2.1 Hoare Logic 
The Coq proofs rely on a particular feature of the chosen program logic and target language 
within CompCert: Hoare Logic, and specifically Hoare triples [6]. Hoare triples are a composition 
of a statement ​c ​and two predicates ​P ​and ​Q ​on states:​ ​{​P​} ​c ​{​Q​}, where if the state​ ​before ​c 
executes satisfies ​P​, then after ​c​ executes the state satisfies ​Q​. This is the root of the functional 
specifications seen later, along with the basis for how we can do symbolic execution on each C 
statement to step through the proof.  
 
For those unfamiliar, here is an example of how the sequential composition rule of Hoare logic 
works. If we start with the predicate ​P = { x => 3 }​ and the commands ​y = x - 2; z = y + 1; ​and ​a 
= x​, then the set of predicates ​Q = { y => 1; z => 2 } ​would hold on the new state after the 
commands executed, as would any set of predicates with the variables set to their proper 
values.  
2.2.2 Tutorial 
To assist in understanding the basics of the VST, we have prepared a tutorial that can be used 
alongside the one described on the VST home page [6]. We will focus here on how to use the 
Coq tactics introduced by VST to progress through the necessary proofs, broken into a few 
large categories: Hoare logic commands, arithmetic commands, memory management, and 
entailments.  
 
First let us show the program that we are working on proving to provide context to our example 
proof.  
void​ addVal​(​int​ bits​[],​ ​int​ n​,​ ​int​ size​)​ { 
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  ​int​ i​, ​ x; 
  i ​=​ ​0; 
  x ​=​ ​0; 
  ​while​ ​(​i ​<​ size​)​ { 
    x ​=​ bits​[​i​]; 
    x ​=​ x ​+​ n; 
    bits ​[​i​]​ ​=​ x; 
    i​++; 
  } 
  ​return ​; 
} 
 
int​ four ​[​4​]​ ​=​ ​{​1 ​,​2​,​3​,​4​}; 
 
int​ main ​(​void​)​ { 
  addVal ​(​four​,​ ​4 ​,​ ​4​); 




As we can see it is a fairly simple program, which does array reads and writes along with 
function calls and a loop. While simple it ultimately does cover the basics of all programs.  
Before we get into the tactics there is some background Coq work that we should examine. First 
and foremost we need to examine functional specifications. Functional specifications are the 
way we tell Coq what functions are expected to do. This entails preconditions, postconditions, 
changes to data passed in, local variables used, and the returned values. These are then 
proven by the VST to be the basis of our formal proofs. An example of these appear below: 
Definition​ addVal_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _addVal 
    WITH bits​:​ val​,​ sh​:​ share​,​ contents ​:​ list Z​,​ n ​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
    PRE ​[​ _bits OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _n OF tint​,​ _size OF tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ size ​<​ ​Int​.​max_signed​;  
                 size ​=​  ​Zlength​ contents; 
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ contents) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _bits bits​;​ temp _n ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr n​));  
   temp _size ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr size​))) 
          SEP   ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr contents​))​ bits) 
    POST ​[​tvoid​]  
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      PROP ​()​ LOCAL ​()  
      SEP ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
        ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map (fun i => ​Int​.​add i ​(​Int​.​repr n​)) (​map ​Int​.​repr contents​)))​ bits​). 
 
The ​WITH ​clause describes the Coq inputs to the function. The arrays following the ​PRE​ and 
POST​-conditions declarations describe the C parameters and return value respectively, with the 
PROP, LOCAL, ​and ​SEP​ clauses describe requirements of the inputs and the states at the 
beginning and end of the function. The ​PROP​ clause is a set of formal Coq propositions that 
must be proven upon calls to the function, the ​LOCAL​ clause holding any variables that would 
be necessary, and the ​SEP​ clause holding any information regarding memory management. 
When the proof of this function begins, we will have the hypotheses in the ​PROP​ clause as 
assumptions in our proof state, with the ​SEP​ clause commonly holding ​data_at​ clauses that 
state the values held in memory.  
 
What does our specific precondition mean though? The first two statements in the ​PROP​ clause 
describe that the ​share​ which describes how data in arrays can be accessed, and in particular 
that the function has both read and write access. The third and fourth statements tell us that the 
size​ parameter is a nonnegative 32-bit signed integer which has the same value as the length of 
the array that has been passed in. Lastly, each of the values in the array can be represented by 
a 32-bit signed integer. The ​LOCAL​ clause describes how the function parameters match up to 
the Coq values in the ​WITH​ clause, and in our case that the function parameter ​_bits​ holds the 
value of ​bits​, and that ​_n​ and ​_size​ hold the integer representations of the parameters ​n​ and 
size​ respectively. Lastly, our ​SEP​ clause tells us that there is an array at address ​bits​, that can 
be accessed with share ​sh​ and containing ​contents​. Our postcondition is far simpler, the 
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function returns no value and the array now holds the value of ​Int.add (Int.repr n) ​applied​ ​to 
each value in the original array.  
 
With that in hand, we can begin with the set of commands related to Hoare logic - those focused 
around processing a C command (normally a line of code) and advancing the program state 
based on that command. This is a small group of tactics, but often involves other portions of the 
proof as their parameters. The tactics include ​forward, forward_if, forward_call, ​and 
forward_while​. The ​forward ​tactic handles simple things like variable assignment, return 
statements, memory loads and assignments, continue statements, and break statements. Of 
those, anything interacting with memory will require bounds checking subgoals, which we will 
look at later. The remaining tactics require inputs with their use. The ​forward_if ​tactic requires a 
postcondition that describes the final state after either branch executes. The ​forward_call ​tactic 
requires the functional specification for the function being called. Lastly the ​forward_while​ tactic 
requires a loop invariant, which describes what each step of the loop should do. That will be 
described in detail on its first usage.  
 
Our proof centers around proving each function in our program to be formally correct. This is 
done by first providing functional specifications, as described above, followed by proving that 
each step in the program is correct via the Hoare logic tactics. The proof just showing the Hoare 
logic tactics follows, with expanded commentary afterwards.  
 
Lemma​ body_addVal​:​  semax_body ​Vprog​ ​Gprog​ f_addVal addVal_spec. 
Proof. 
start_function. 
forward​. ​ ​(*​ i ​=​ ​0​ ​*) 
forward​. ​ ​(*​ x ​=​ ​0​ ​*) 
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forward_while ​(​addVal_Inv bits sh contents n size​). 
*​ ​(*​ 1. ​Prove​ that current precondition implies loop invariant ​*) 
Omitted tactics 
*​ ​(*​ 2. ​Prove​ that loop invariant implies loop ending condition will occur ​*) 
Omitted tactics 
*​ ​(*​ 3. ​Prove​ postcondition of loop body implies loop invariant ​*) 
(*​ start with x ​=​ bits​[​i​]​ ​*)  
Forward. 
  ​(*​ bounds check requirement, index manipulation work ​*) 
(*​ x ​=​ x ​+​ n ​*) 
forward​.  
(*​ bits​[ ​i​]​ ​=​ x ​*) 
forward. 
(*​ i​++;​ ​*) 
forward. 
(*​ end of for loop ​*) 
(*​ now we have to prove that we have created the next instance of the loop invariant ​*) 
  (* array manipulation work, see below *) 
*​ ​(*​ 4. prove the code that is after the loop ​*) 
forward. ​(*​ return; ​*) 




The opening lines up to ​start_function​ are boilerplate code for all functions and they generate 
the environment for the Hoare logic tactics to work in, and provides it with known hypotheses 
(pulled from the preconditions) along with the C command and local variables that we are 
currently working with. Lastly, it creates a series of commands within ​Ssequence​ clauses to be 
individually handled and processed. From here we can follow through our C code verification, 
one step at a time.  
 
Our program begins with the following set of lines: ​int​ i​,​ x; i ​=​ ​0;​ x ​=​ ​0;​. As mentioned 
earlier, simple assignment statements are handled with the ​forward​ tactic, but what does it do in 
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this context? Each one peels off an ​Ssequence ​clause to see the command within, and if the 
tactic matches the command, the tactic successfully executes. In this case, the ​Sset​ statement 
adds the internal variable to the ​LOCAL​ clause and then sets the next state up. After those lines 
have been executed, we now arrive at our ​while ​loop, which requires a different set of 
information.  
 
As stated before, the ​forward_while​ tactic requires a loop invariant to process. For our ​addVal 
function, the loop within has an invariant as shown below: 
Definition​ addVal_Inv bits sh original_contents n size ​:= 
  EX i​:​ Z, 
    PROP ​(​0​ ​<=​ i ​<=​ size) 
    LOCAL ​(​temp _bits bits​;  
          temp _i ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr i​)); 
          temp _n ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr n​)); 
          temp _size ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr size​))) 
    SEP ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size) 
          ​((​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ ​Int​.​add i ​(​Int​.​repr n​))  
            ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist ​0​ i original_contents​))))​ ​++  
   ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist i size original_contents​))))​ bits​). 
 
This describes what we expect our program state to be in when we begin processing a loop. We 
have a precondition that describes the bounds on the loop, a set of local variables we expect to 
manipulate or use during the loop, and a description of any memory we use during the loop, 
which can describe changes made during the loop. This invariant is passed to the ​forward_while 
loop, along with the parameters needed by the invariant, in our case the ​bits, sh, contents, n, 
and, ​size​ fields. Thus our final command ends up being  
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forward_while ​(​addVal_Inv bits sh contents n size​). 
 
 
We can pause for a moment to look at the ​SEP​ clause and examine what it is saying about this 
loop. This ​data_at​ clause holds that everything below the index we are currently working on (​i) 
has had its value modified by the addition function, with everything above it still holding its 
original value. With this we describe how we modify values step by step.  
 
The ​forward_while​ tactic does not simply generate the next step in the proof though, it 
generates four distinct subgoals to handle. First the current program state needs to satisfy the 
loop invariant, which will be briefly touched on later, along with the second proof goal, which 
claims that (in this case) the loop condition is guaranteed to successfully execute. The third goal 
is of interest currently though, it describes stepping through the body of the while loop and 
proving that at the conclusion of the loop the program state satisfies the loop invariant again. 
The final subgoal will be to prove the code after the loop with the final instantiation of the 
invariant as the precondition. 
 
From here we can focus on the loop body section. Our first command is ​x ​=​ bits​[​i​];​ which is an 
assignment so we can process it simply using ​forward​. However, one might note that an access 
of a C array can have undefined behavior if the index of the array is out of bounds. For that 
reason, when we attempt this goal we get a subgoal to prove that the index is in bounds. This 
specific subgoal proof will be briefly covered when we discuss memory management. 
Discharging this responsibility for now, we can continue proving the loop body.  
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This leaves us with three remaining statements:  which each simply x n; bits[i] x; i +;x =  +   =   +  
process using ​forward​. With those statements concluded, we are left with a goal to prove that 
the current program state is once again an instantiation of the loop invariant. Parts of this will be 
covered later within the memory management and entailment sections, but we can again move 
on for now, leaving us at the program state after the ​while​ loop. Lastly, we clear our a final 
return​ via ​forward​, leaving us a separation logic proof that the postcondition of the function has 
been fulfilled, concluding the proof of the ​addVal ​function body.  
 
The Hoare logic proof is not finished yet: We also need to prove the body of the ​main​ function in 
order to have proven the total behavior of our program. The ​main ​function utilizes an external 
array definition, so we define it in our proof script as follows: 
Definition​ four_contents ​:=​ ​[​1​;​ ​2​;​ ​3​;​ ​4​]. 
From there we begin our proof the same as for the ​addVal​ function, with a statement added to 
map the definition we just added:  
Lemma​ body_main​: ​  semax_body ​Vprog​ ​Gprog​ f_main main_spec. 
Proof. 
name four _four. 
Start_function. 
forward_call (*  addVal(four,4,4); *) 
  (four,Ews,four_contents,4,4). 
 split3; auto. split. computable. repeat constructor; computable. 
forward. (* return 0; *) 
Qed​. 
 
From there we use the ​forward_call​ Hoare logic tactic, which uses the ​PROP ​precondition from 
the functional specification to provide new subgoals, and confirms that all values passed in 
match those used by the ​WITH​ clause in the specification. Our call requires an array (the global 
variable stored in ​four​), a ​share​ which describes who is allowed to access the data (in our case 
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a defined value ​Ews​ which is a share that marks both reading and writing allowed), and two 
integers, one the size of our data, and one the value to add to each value in the array (both 4 for 
us).  
 
Our precondition had five propositions within it, and we must prove them before we move on. 
Two of them are related to whether our chosen share is readable and writable (which we have 
chosen to be true) and are each dismissed with a usage of ​auto​ (a tactic that applies a set of 
known lemmas). The next two relate to the size of our given array, that it is less than the 
maximum integer value, which we discharge using arithmetic tactics, and that the length is 
indeed precisely 4, which is by definition of the construction of an array, which is represented in 
the ​constructor​ tactic. Repeating that same tactic with ​computable​ clears out the remaining 
necessary precondition that all values in the array are within the bounds of signed integers. With 
that requirement discharged, we now have a new proof state with the postcondition of the 
functional specification replacing the values as expected. With no other call other than to ​return 
from the function, we call ​forward​ one final time to complete the proof of the ​main ​function.  
 
The last thing to do is to tie the functions together with a final Lemma. It begins the same for all 
programs:  
Lemma​ all_funcs_correct: 
  semax_func ​Vprog​ ​Gprog​ ​(​prog_funct prog​)​ ​Gprog. 
Proof. 
unfold ​Gprog​,​ prog​,​ prog_funct​;​ simpl. 
From there the remaining task is simple: in the same order as they were declared and proven, 





With that complete, the high level proof of the functional specifications and function bodies is 
complete, ignoring some details.  
 
One can note that if we desire to treat a specific function as a black box where we do not care 
about the actual function body we could simply declare our desired functional specification and 
assert the body proof, meaning we can get intermediate levels of verification depending on 
whether the man hours are available to formally verify more complicated functions (such as 
cryptographic functions, an example of this will be seen in the proof of our program).  
 
Next we should discuss entailments, and what they mean within Hoare logic. An entailment is a 
statement in the form ​P ​⊢​ Q​, where ​P​ and ​Q​ are sets of predicates on the state of the program. 
States include local variables, the contents of the heap, and potentially other external states, 
though those are currently not well supported within VST. Within the context of VST, ​P​ and ​Q 
will take a form similar to that of functional specifications, with the following form, which in 










When seen during a Coq proof, we handle these with the ​entailer!​ tactic, which will automatically 
process as much of the proof as possible, with the propositions of ​P’​ being checked against 
known hypotheses and common rewrites done (those without generated subgoals commonly). 
Frequently the use of ​entailer!​ will leave subgoals regarding ​data_at​ clauses, which covers the 
values in memory. There is a second form of entailment seen while proving loops, as stated 
above: that of proving that the negation of the loop-test expression. The statement must execute 
without crashing, all variables it references exist and are initialized, the statement doesn’t divide 
by zero, among other requirements.  
 
This leaves two types of tactics we need to use left to discuss: arithmetic/automation tactics and 
memory management tactics. Arithmetic tactics are straightforward, if sometimes a bit awkward 
to use. The tactics include ​simpl, computable, auto,​ and ​omega​, all of which simplify obvious 
math steps or proof goals that have their statement within the proven hypotheses. Using the 
replace ... with​ ​... by ...​ tactic is advised to help do simplifications of mathematical statements 
within proofs to avoid having to ​assert​ and ​rewrite​ by the new hypothesis.  
 
This leaves memory management goals and list manipulation type tactics. The tactics here are 
too numerous to list, but in general can be discovered via ​SearchAbout​ within Coq and have 
somewhat intuitive names. We will go through an example of these sorts of proofs with a proof 
of an array access, the first command of the loop body.  
 
The generated goal to prove regarding the array access is shown below (note that ++ 
represents a list append):  
is_int I32 ​Signed 
  ​(​Znth​ i 
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     ​(​map ​Vint​ ​( ​map ​(​fun i0 ​:​ ​int​ ​=>​ ​Int​.​add i0 ​(​Int​.​repr n​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist ​0​ i 
contents ​)))​ ​++​ map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist i ​(​Zlength​ contents​)​ contents​)))​ ​Vundef) 
In C-code, we can think of the ​Znth​ portion of the initial state as the following: 
bits_contents[0 ] + bits_contents[i ize])[i]  ( : i +  : s
The full proof body is shown below, and as above for the Hoare logic proof, we will walk through 
the steps to describe the changes.  
rewrite app_Znth2​.  
(* *)bits_contents[i ize])[i length(bits_contents(0 ))]  ( : s −  : i  
repeat rewrite initial_world​.​Zlength_map​.  
rewrite ​Zlength_sublist​;​ ​try​ omega. 
(* *)bits_contents[i ize])[i i]  ( : s −   
rewrite ​Znth_map ​ ​with​ ​(​d​':=Int.zero). hnf; auto.  
(*​ bounds check ​from​ ​Znth_map​ ​*) 
rewrite initial_world​.​Zlength_map​.​ rewrite ​Zlength_sublist​;​ ​try​ omega​.  
(*​ confirm that i ​is​ ​in​ fact more than ​or​ equal to i​...​ ​from​ app_Znth2 ​*) 
rewrite initial_world​.​Zlength_map​.  
rewrite map2_len ​.  
rewrite initial_world​.​Zlength_map​.  
rewrite ​Zlength_sublist​;​ ​try​ omega​.  
 
 
We also have in hand a number of assumptions, including one in particular that 
. In essence, this boils down to asking if the value found in a list at index ​i​ is Zlength contents  i <   
an integer (i.e. in bounds). The proof may seem obvious as there is a sublist from index ​i​ to a 
value that is larger than ​i​, but this is the burden of a formally verified proof: all goals, no matter 
how obvious, must be fully discharged to have the guarantee. A side note is that many memory 
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related tactics will spawn off subgoals of their own, many of which will process easily at the 
conclusion of the proof of the main goal.  
 
With this in mind, let’s step through the tactics used. First we should strip out the first portion of 
our array, since we will be able to prove that the index lies in the second part of the list, we do 
this via ​app_Znth2​. This spawns a subgoal to prove the following:  
i ​>=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map (fun i => Int.add i (Int.repr n)) ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist ​0​ i 
contents ​))​ ​(​Int​. ​repr n​))) 
Along with progressing our current proof to the following:  
is_int I32 ​Signed 
  ​(​Znth​ ​(​i ​-​ ​Zlength​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map (fun i => Int.add i (Int.repr n)) ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist ​0 
i contents​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr n​)))) 
     ​(​map ​Vint​ ​( ​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist i ​(​Zlength​ contents​)​ contents​)))​ ​Vundef) 
Continuing our C analogy, this gives us as ourbits_contents[i ize])[i length(bits_contents(0 ))]  ( : s −  : i  
inside state.  
 
Next we focus on peeling the length of the sublist out of the chain of function calls, but we can 
not simply do this immediately. First we peel back layers of mapped functions with 
initial_world.Zlength_map ​usage. This leaves our sublist directly within the ​Zlength​ function, 
where we can use ​Zlength_sublist​ to pull out the length of the list. This tactic does produce two 
simple arithmetic subgoals that we are able to clear away by trying to apply ​omega​ to all 
generated subgoals. This leaves us at the following proof goal state:  
is_int I32 ​Signed​ ​(​Znth​ ​(​i ​-​ ​(​i ​-​ ​0​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​sublist i ​(​Zlength​ contents​) 
contents ​)))​ ​Vundef)​, which roughly equates to .bits_contents[i ize])[i i]  ( : s −   
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From there we get rid of the ​Vint​ mapping a rewriting of ​Znth_map​, which requires a parameter 
of converting the default value if the index is out of range (not an issue for us, but still a 
formality). The tactic ​hnf​ (which is a Coq tactic that reduces the current goal to its head normal 
form) converts the remaining goal to ​True​, and it gets finished by ​auto​. Since goals are added to 
the top of the list of subgoals, we deal with two subgoals (from ​Znth_map​ and ​app_Znth2​) 
before we can move on. The ​Znth_map​ goal checks that the index is in range of the sublist, and 
clears out with ​initial_world.Zlength_map​ and ​Zlength_sublist​. The ​app_Znth2​ subgoal checks 
that the provided index is larger than the size of the first half of the appended lists, and clears 
out much the same. With those subgoals handled, the memory check is complete.  
 
Users looking for further examples can review the associated proof script and step through the 
goals and tactics to see the process in detail.  
 
Chapter 3: Full Receipt Validation Program 
Now with a deeper understanding of Chaum’s scheme and a fairly detailed description of how 
proofs proceed in the Verified Software Toolchain, we can pursue our primary focus: creating a 
C program to implement the receipt verification portion of Chaum’s scheme, and then formally 
verify it using the same process just covered in the tutorial. The outcome of this effort is simply 
the C program to verify, the Abstract Syntax Tree created from the CompCert tool Clightgen, 
and the Coq .v file used to formally verify the AST from Clightgen. When the Coq file is 
processed start to finish, each proof will complete successfully, and thus the file as a whole will 
pass verification.  
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In the process of proving the file as a whole, we will focus primarily on a particular function: the 
certifyReceipt​ function. This function takes the contents of a receipt as described in chapter two 
as input and returns true if and only if the first two sections of the receipt verification process 
described in 2.1.2 are accurate for the given input (the third portion, regarding the construction 
of the requisite doll, is a topic for a future study). This in turn utilizes the other functions of the 
file, all the way down to a ​deSignInt​ function, which each have their behaviors proved as well. 
The ​deSignInt​ could be either a fully specified cryptographic function or simply an assumed one 
if we want to keep it in the trusted base.  
 
Thus with the full stack of functions having a set of associated proofs of their function bodies 
and functional specifications, we can make a meaningful statement about our program’s 
behavior. Interestingly, the final statement that we can make about our our proofs comes after 
defining the boundaries of our proof: the postcondition of our functional specification is the 
output of the function body. Ultimately, what we are interested in proving can be summed up as 
follows: the output of the ​certifyReceipt​ function is 1 if and only if the value representing the 
signed serial number can have the inverse signature function applied to get the original serial 
number and the tuple of values included as the second portion of the receipt can be designed to 
get their corresponding unsigned values.  
 
We now quickly go over the source file. There is a wide array of technical detail in the functions, 
from a simple ​xor​ for the designing function (to be further touched on later) to checking the 
values across arrays. In terms of C code, it is not anything groundbreaking, but certain portions 
were constructed with the proof necessities in mind. Boolean flags were used to carry values 
38 
through a series of comparisons rather than immediately returning, and rather than branching 
off into two paths of computation a set of variables are assigned whose differing values create 
the change. Each of those choices were made to drastically reduce the complexity of the branch 
points within the proofs of the function body, as while they are certainly not what we might 
normally do when writing code, they function just the same (albeit slower) and make the proofs 
more manageable. The full source code can be found in appendix A.  
 
Chapter 4: Verification of the Program 
As mentioned before, certain sections of the C code were determined by how to make the 
proofs easier. That said, certain parts of the VST Coq structures still provide limits and 
constraints on what we can do within the proof proper. Additionally, as the proof got stronger 
and stronger as we extended what the function is meant to prove, the pre- and post-conditions 
get progressively more complicated, which will cause some issues as seen below.  
 
4.1 Coq File 
For our verification, much of it closely follows the tutorial proof above. We use the ​clightgen 
utility to transform the C file into the Abstract Syntax Tree in Coq, then importing that into our 
verification file. From there, we define our set of functional specifications, which bound the 
strength of our proof bodies. These functional specifications vary from the simple as seen in 
portions of the tutorial to the complex, which we see when we get to the functional specifications 
of the ​certifyReceipt​ function. Interspersed within our functional specifications are a set of a Coq 
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definition and lemmas that help define what our goals are within those specifications. This 
definition is an integer array equality definition, and have had various lemmas proven to assist in 
their operation while in the middle of a list.  
4.1.1 Functional Specifications 
The functional specifications for the set of functions describing the first portion of our desired 
proof (that the serial is the same as the value that should represent the signed serial with the 
designature function applied) are straightforward: since we’ve defined our ​deSignInteger 
function to be an integer ​xor ​at the top of the Coq file, the ​deSignInt​ function returns the ​xor ​of 
the input value and the provided key, and the ​checkSerial​ function takes the original serial, the 
provided value, and the needed key, see below.  
Definition​ deSignInt_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _deSignInt 
   WITH bit ​:​ ​int​,​ invKey ​:​ ​int 
   PRE ​[ ​_bit OF ​(​tint​),​ _invKey OF ​(​tint​)] 
       PROP ​() 
       LOCAL ​(​temp _bit ​(​Vint​ bit​);​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ invKey​)) 
       SEP ​() 
   POST ​[​tint​]  
       PROP​() 
       LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​deSignInteger bit invKey​))) 
       SEP​(). 
 
Definition​ checkSerial_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkSerial 
   WITH q ​:​ ​int​, ​ qSigned ​:​ ​int​,​ invKey ​:​ ​int 
   PRE ​[ ​_q OF ​(​tint​),​ _qSigned OF ​(​tint​),​ _invKey OF ​(​tint​)] 
     PROP ​() 
     LOCAL ​(​temp _q ​(​Vint​ q​);​ temp _qSigned ​(​Vint​ qSigned​);​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ invKey​)) 
     SEP ​() 
   POST ​[​tint] 
     PROP ​() 
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     LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ​Int​.​eq q ​(​deSignInteger qSigned invKey​)​ ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1 
else​ ​Int ​.​repr ​0​))) 
     SEP ​(). 
 
The next set of functions in our C file describe those needed to compare two arrays of values, 
as we have three sets of arrays that will need to be checked in the second portion of our target 
goal (the layer, top doll, and bottom doll, each with their respective list that we expect to 
represent the signed versions). This requires an additional way of defining a map (one that 
takes an additional value that we apply on every index in the list), which we borrow from the 
tutorial. Then we extend the designing function across an array, since if we have an array of 
integers the function just extends across the array we are in luck here as seen below. 
Definition​ deSignArray_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _deSignArray 
    WITH bits​:​ val​,​ sh​:​ share​,​ contents ​:​ list Z​,​ invKey ​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
    PRE ​[​ _bits OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _invKey OF tint​,​ _size OF tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ size ​<​ ​Int​.​max_signed​;  
                 size ​=​ ​Zlength​ contents; 
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ contents) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _bits bits​;​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​));​ temp _size ​(​Vint 
(​Int​.​repr size​))) 
          SEP   ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr contents​))​ bits) 
    POST ​[​tvoid​] ​ PROP ​()​ LOCAL ​()  
      SEP ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
        ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))  
           (​map ​Int​.​repr contents​)))​ bits​). 
 
Our functional specification for this function is quite similar to that of the mapAdd function in the 
tutorial, with a ​deSignInteger​ swapped in for the ​add​ of that. The more interesting portion is the 
checkArray function, where we loop over an array and compile the information piece by piece 
that the two arrays match at each index.  
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The functional specification has grown with the number of variables involved in the function, but 
the function size is still manageable with the use of our custom fixpoint. One thing to note here 
is that despite the fact that we never directly change the arrays in the ​checkArray​ function, the 
data in the arrays still changes since we call a function that does change those values, so we 
must account for that in the specification. The return value of this function is straightforward as 
well with our fixpoint, it directly correlates to the output. Below shows just the postcondition of 
the ​checkArray​ function, since the precondition can easily be derived from the expected values. 
Definition​ checkArray_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkArray 
    WITH signedBits​:​ val​,​ originalBits​:​ val​,​ sh​:​ share​,  
         signedContents ​:​ list Z​,​ originalContents ​:​ list Z​,​ invKey ​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
... 
    POST ​[​tint​]  
      PROP  ​()  
      LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ​(​foralleq ​(*​signedContents originalContents​)*) 
                  ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
signedContents​))) 
                  ​(​map ​Int​.​repr originalContents) 
                ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1​ ​else​ ​Int​.​repr ​0​)))  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
signedContents​)))​ signedBits​); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr originalContents​)) 
originalBits​)). 
 
With that out of the way, we can do the work behind checking that the full tuple has all of the 
values matching properly. This is where we run into a bit of an odd problem with the VST 
module within Coq: there is a limit of fourteen arguments to a functional specification. If a 
function starts to approach that many arguments, this becomes an issue, as ​share​ values along 
with the existence of two values in the ​WITH​ clause for each array value can easily push the 
total Coq parameters over the limit. The solution we use is simply to combine these values into 
42 
tuples. While it makes the specification slightly harder to read, the input values remain the 
same, we just need to parse them out of the tuples prior to their usage, see the beginning of the 
functional specification below:  
Definition​ checkTuple_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkTuple 
    WITH layer_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ q​:​ Z​,​ topDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         botDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ v​:​ Z​,  
         k_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ r​:​ Z​,​ i_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         j_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ w​:​ Z​,  
         sh​:​ share​,​ key​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
 
Once that hurdle has been overcome, the specification does follow closely from the other 
specifications, with the only change being the chaining of conditionals (since we need to check 
each of the five values within the signed tuple) using ​andb​ in the return condition. Everything 
else becomes a matter of scale: frustrating to deal with, but doesn’t present much of a mental 
hurdle to get past. The postcondition is shown below to show the chainings of conditionals and 
the multiple modified arrays from the calls within.  
    POST ​[​tint] 
      PROP ​() 
      LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ( 
              andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
k_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr q​)​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr r​)​ ​(​Int​.​repr key​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​))) 
              ​(( ​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr v​)​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr w​)​ ​(​Int​.​repr key​)))))))) 
                ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1​ ​else​ ​Int​.​repr ​0​)))  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
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               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
k_var​))))​ ​(​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
i_var​))))​ ​(​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
j_var​))))​ ​(​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
botDoll_var​))). 
 
We now have our segments for the two portions of our proof, the only thing left to do is combine 
them and we have a function to certify receipts. However, there are some additional 
considerations for certifying a receipt, primarily that we have to be able to verify both a receipt 
with the bottom layer chosen and a receipt with the top layer chosen. We can pass in a flag that 
shows which one to use along with values for each of the four keys (one for tuple, one for serial 
for both top and bottom), but the conditions and changes to the arrays will depend upon the 
which layer we have been given. While this is handled in five lines of the C code, it makes our 
functional specification a staggering 99 lines in length. The precondition follows from the other 
functions in an increase in complexity, but again only in length and the number of variables we 
need to check on. The postcondition is where the struggles lay though, as the output is 
dependent on that split. The return variable splits based upon the flag and uses the requisite 
variables within the composite check of the serial and tuple rather simply, but there is a struggle 




      PROP ​() 
      LOCAL ​(...) 
      ​if ​ ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst topFlag_size​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​1​)) 
             ​then  
       SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd k_var​))))​ ​( ​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))))​ ​( ​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))))​ ​( ​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst botDoll_var​))) 
             ​else  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd k_var​))))​ ​( ​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))))​ ​( ​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))))​ ​( ​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst botDoll_var​))).  
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Attempting to split within the ​SEP​ clause generates unexpected and strange errors that are 
difficult to adequately address, which is when it becomes valuable to learn that the ​POST​ clause 
can have an ​if​ statement return different ​SEP ​clauses and not be an issue. With that in hand, we 
can now split our newly mapped arrays based on the appropriate key. Since the ​main​ function’s 
functional specification is the same for all files, this completes the first portion of our proof 
discussion, leaving just the bodies of the proofs to examine. See appendix B for the full 
functional specifications.  
 
As stated in the tutorial, we prove the functions in the order they are defined, which means we 
start out with some proofs that are very similar to those we saw in the tutorial, or are otherwise 
fairly simple.  
4.1.2 Validation Program Proof 
With our functional specifications in hand, we can go about proving each of our functions to 
have that specification. We will skim over the opening proofs of ​deSignInt​, ​checkSerial​, and 
deSignArray​, as each of those are either simply very straight forward or derivative of work seen 
in the tutorial. The code becomes more interesting after that though, with ​checkArray​ requiring a 
new property to work with and more advanced loop behavior. The property ​foralleq​ is true if and 
only if all values in two lists are the same, and we want to build this property up by iterating 
through the lists. This is straightforward in the C code, but the list manipulation in Coq presents 
issues for us, mostly due to needing to prove that both arrays provide an integer to compare. 
Ultimately, unfolding values within one of the hypotheses enabled us to get to a point where the 
proof goal can simplify easily. With that in hand, the rest of the proof follows much as the others.  
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The other two proofs that we have to focus on are our ​checkTuple​ function and our 
certifyReceipt​ functions. The ​checkTuple​ function proof is in fact as straightforward as we could 
possibly hope, we call each function in turn as in the source code and use the preconditions of 
the ​checkTuple ​function to prove each of the called functions’ preconditions. To prove the 
checkTuple​ function, we simply destruct on each of the conditions of the tuple check. By 
chaining the commands together, we fortunately can avoid having to prove each case 
individually, and this applies to ​certifyReceipt​ as well.  
 
We do largely the same thing for ​certifyReceipt, ​with a difference being that we need to decide 
which of our keys to be used for checking the tuple and serial number. Once we have done that, 
we can continue, with conditionals determining which of our keys to use. We once again 
destruct on each of our conditionals, for the return value, then again on determining the final 
values of the arrays. With that finished, our proof is complete.  
Chapter 5: Future Work 
Some may note that we have used a simple ​xor​ function as our function to design integers and 
arrays and that as such the code is not cryptographically secure. However, it can be noted that 
this still fulfills the specification of Chaum’s scheme in the manner of the signing functions for 
both the serial number and the tuple of data. We can simply take the ​xor ​function to be the 
provided designing function, as both the and functions and our defined hardcoded keyso−1 s−1  
to be the provided keys of those functions. While this is not necessarily an implementation of the 
verification and scheme that would want to be used in a production server, it does serve an 
important role in the path of progress. With this proof now in hand others can improve on the 
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functions used, replacing the insecure ​xor​ with a full fledged cryptographic function, and so long 
as the functional specification still fits (which it will for any function of type ​Int​ -> ​Int​), the only 
thing that will need to be updated is the proof of that designing function.  
 
Additionally, with this proof there is a motivation to provide such a proof for a cryptographic 
designing function - it immediately provides value when put in combination with this proof, 
naturally expanding the value that this initial set of proofs has provided. The nice thing is that for 
our purposes the signing function (along with the decryption function) does not require a proof - 
those are taken as black boxes that we hope are working properly but for our purposes it does 
not matter, if not then our verification function will simply fail.  
 
In order to bring the code and proof to fully implement a more secure Chaum’s scheme, replace 
the ​deSignInteger​ function definition with a full designing algorithm. When proving the function 
body of ​deSignInt​, simply expand the function definition to get the entire description available 
and to sanity check that the result of the function is matching the progress of the proof. The rest 
of the proof body should remain constant, without any need to consider the change.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Our goal when we began this thesis was the formal verification of a program designed to verify 
portions of a receipt given as the output of Chaum’s scheme. In doing so, we hoped to provide a 
framework for others to use as a launching pad for future endeavors along a similar branch of 
research and produce an example of VST being applied to a practical real-world algorithm that 
has a more entry level friendly description than that of the SHA-256 paper.  
48 
 
In this we have mostly succeeded - we have finished a more thorough tutorial as designed, 
however we fell a touch short in our hopes for the verification of the validation function. An 
observant eye would note that there are three pieces necessary to validate a receipt, and our 
certifyReceipt​ function only has the first two of those. Ultimately this would not solve any 
additional interesting problems though, as we would once again be using placeholders for both 
the cryptographic hash function and the encryption function and the proofs for them would be 
time consuming but in the same vein as those already completed.  
Appendix A: verify.c Source Code 
/* 
 ​*​ ​Verification​ program ​for​ ​Chaum​'s scheme 
 ​*​ ​@author​ kms7341@rit​.​edu 
 ​*/ 
 
// note on array lengths: chaum's scheme can operate at any scale 
// we've chosen size = 8 since that is reasonably large without 
// imposing undue costs of size and time 
 
 
int​ deSignInt​(​int​ bit​,​ ​int​ invKey​)​ { 
  ​return ​ bit ​^​ invKey; 
} 
 
// only need deSign for first two portions 
 
int​ checkSerial​( ​int​ q​,​ ​int​ qSigned​,​ ​int​ invKey​)​ { 
  ​int​ q2 ​;  
  q2 ​=​ deSignInt ​(​qSigned​,​ invKey​); 
  ​if​ ​(​q2 ​==​ q) 
    ​return​ ​1; 
  ​return ​ ​0; 
} 
 
//next set of conditions: needs designArray 
 
void​ deSignArray ​(​int​ bits​[],​ ​int​ invKey​,​ ​int​ size​)​ { 
  ​int​ i ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ bit ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ ans ​=​ ​0; 
  ​while​ ​(​i ​<​ size​)​ { 
    bit ​=​ bits​[​i ​]; 
    ans ​=​ deSignInt​(​bit​,​ invKey​); 
    bits ​[​i​]​ ​=​ ans​;  
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    i​++; 
  } 
} 
 
int​ checkArray​(​int​ signedBits​[],​ ​int​ originalBits​[],​ ​int​ invKey​,​ ​int​ size​)​ { 
  deSignArray​(​signedBits​,​ invKey​,​ size​);  
  ​int​ i ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ bit1 ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ bit2 ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ flag ​=​ ​1; 
  ​while​ ​(​i ​<​ size​)​ { 
    bit1 ​=​ signedBits​[​i​]; 
    bit2 ​=​ originalBits​[​i​]; 
    ​if​ ​( ​bit1 ​!=​ bit2​)​ { 
      flag ​=​ ​0; 
    } 
    i​++; 
  } 
  ​return ​ flag; 
} 
 
int​ checkTuple​(​int​ layer​[],​ ​int​ q​,​ ​int​ topDoll​[],​ ​int​ botDoll​[],​ ​int​ v, 
int​ k​[],​ ​int​ r​,​ ​int​ i​[],​ ​int​ j​[],​ ​int​ w​,​ ​int​ key​,​ ​int​ size​)​ { 
  ​int​ flag ​=​ ​1; 
  ​int​ val ​=​ ​0; 
  val ​=​ checkArray​(​k​,​ layer​,​ key​,​ size​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  val ​=​ checkSerial​(​q​,​ r​,​ key​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  val ​=​ checkArray​(​i​,​ topDoll​,​ key​,​ size​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  val ​=​ checkArray​(​j​,​ botDoll​,​ key​,​ size​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  val ​=​ checkSerial​(​v​,​ w​,​ key​);  
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  ​return ​ flag; 
} 
 
int​ certifyReceipt​(​int​ topFlag​,​ ​int​ layer​[],​ ​int​ q​,​ ​int​ topDoll​[],​ ​int​ botDoll​[],​ ​int​ v, 
int​ k​[],​ ​int​ r​,​ ​int​ i​[],​ ​int​ j​[],​ ​int​ w​,​ ​int​ size​,​ ​// size is constant for all arrays 
int​ topSerialKey​,​ ​int​ botSerialKey​,​ ​int​ topTupleKey​,​ ​int​ botTupleKey​)​ { 
  ​int​ flag ​=​ ​1; 
  ​int​ val ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ serKey ​=​ ​0; 
  ​int​ tupKey ​=​ ​0; 
  ​if​ ​(​topFlag ​== ​ ​1​)​ { 
    serKey ​=​ topSerialKey; 
    tupKey ​=​ topTupleKey; 
  ​}​ ​else ​ { 
    serKey ​=​ botSerialKey; 
    tupKey ​=​ botTupleKey; 
  } 
  val ​=​ checkSerial​(​q​,​ v​,​ serKey​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val; 
  val ​=​ checkTuple​(​layer​,​ q​,​ topDoll​,​ botDoll​,​ v​,  
    k​,​ r ​,​ i​,​ j​,​ w​,​ tupKey​,​ size​); 
  flag ​= ​ flag ​&​ val​;  
  ​return ​ flag; 
} 
 
// arbitrary values 
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int​ qVals​[​8​]​ ​=​ ​{ ​15​,​ ​5463​,​ ​12​,​ ​75​,​ ​231​,​ ​1431​,​ ​735​,​ ​134​}; 
int​ processedQVals​[​8​]​ ​=​ ​{​15​,​ ​5463​,​ ​12​,​ ​75​,​ ​231​,​ ​1431​,​ ​735​,​ ​134​}; 
 
int​ main ​(​void​)​ { 
  ​int​ qsigned​,​ ser; 
  ​int​ q ​=​ ​15687; 
  ​int​ key ​=​ ​4231; 
  qsigned ​=​ deSignInt​(​q​,​ key​);​ ​// xor makes algo same both ways 
  ser ​=​ checkSerial​(​q​,​ qsigned​,​ key​); 
  deSignArray​(​processedQVals​,​ key​,​ ​8​); 
  ​int​ arr ​=​ checkArray​(​processedQVals​,​ qVals​,​ key​,​ ​8​); 
  ​return ​ ser; 
} 
Appendix B: Functional Specifications 
Definition​ deSignInt_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _deSignInt 
   WITH bit ​:​ ​int​,​ invKey ​:​ ​int 
   PRE ​[ ​_bit OF ​(​tint​),​ _invKey OF ​(​tint​)] 
       PROP ​() 
       LOCAL ​(​temp _bit ​(​Vint​ bit​);​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ invKey​)) 
       SEP ​() 
   POST ​[​tint​]  
       PROP​() 
       LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​deSignInteger bit invKey​))) 
       SEP​(). 
 
Definition​ checkSerial_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkSerial 
   WITH q ​:​ ​int​, ​ qSigned ​:​ ​int​,​ invKey ​:​ ​int 
   PRE ​[ ​_q OF ​(​tint​),​ _qSigned OF ​(​tint​),​ _invKey OF ​(​tint​)] 
     PROP ​() 
     LOCAL ​(​temp _q ​(​Vint​ q​);​ temp _qSigned ​(​Vint​ qSigned​);​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ invKey​)) 
     SEP ​() 
   POST ​[​tint] 
     PROP ​() 
     LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ​Int​.​eq q ​(​deSignInteger qSigned invKey​)​ ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1 
else​ ​Int ​.​repr ​0​))) 
     SEP ​(). 
 
Local​ ​Open​ ​Scope ​ logic. 
 
Definition​ deSignArray_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _deSignArray 
    WITH bits​:​ val​,​ sh​:​ share​,​ contents ​:​ list Z​,​ invKey ​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
    PRE ​[​ _bits OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _invKey OF tint​,​ _size OF tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ size ​<​ ​Int​.​max_signed​;​ size ​= 
Zlength​ contents; 
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ contents) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _bits bits​;​ temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​));​ temp _size ​(​Vint 
(​Int​.​repr size​))) 
          SEP   ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr contents​))​ bits) 
    POST ​[​tvoid​] ​ PROP ​()​ LOCAL ​()  
      SEP ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
        ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr contents​))) 
bits​). 
  
Fixpoint ​ foralleq ​(​al​:​ list ​int​)​ ​(​bl​:​ list ​int​)​ ​:​ ​bool​ ​:= 
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  match al ​with  
    ​|​ a​::​al​' => match bl with 
                 ​|​ b​::​bl​' => (Int.eq a b) && (foralleq al'​ bl​') 
                 ​|​ _ ​=>​ ​false 
                ​end 
    ​|​ _ ​=>​ match bl ​with  
            ​|​ b​::​bl​' => false 
            ​|​ _ ​=>​ ​true 
           ​end 
  ​end. 
  
Definition​ checkArray_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkArray 
    WITH signedBits​:​ val​,​ originalBits​:​ val​,​ sh​:​ share​,  
         signedContents ​:​ list Z​,​ originalContents ​:​ list Z​,​ invKey ​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
    PRE ​[​ _signedBits OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _originalBits OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _invKey OF tint​,​ _size OF 
tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ size ​<​ ​Int​.​max_signed​;  
                 size ​=​ ​Zlength​ signedContents​;​ size ​=​ ​Zlength​ originalContents​;  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ signedContents​;  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ originalContents) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _signedBits signedBits​;​ temp _originalBits originalBits​;  
                 temp _invKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​));​ temp _size ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr size​))) 
          SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr signedContents​)) 
signedBits​); 
                 ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr originalContents​)) 
originalBits​)) 
    POST ​[​tint​]  
      PROP  ​()  
      LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ​(​foralleq ​(*​signedContents originalContents​)*) 
                  ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
signedContents​))) 
                  ​(​map ​Int​.​repr originalContents) 
                ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1​ ​else​ ​Int​.​repr ​0​)))  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr invKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
signedContents​)))​ signedBits​); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr originalContents​)) 
originalBits​)). 
 
Definition​ checkTuple_spec ​:= 
  DECLARE _checkTuple 
    WITH layer_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ q​:​ Z​,​ topDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         botDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ v​:​ Z​,  
         k_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ r​:​ Z​,​ i_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         j_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ w​:​ Z​,  
         sh​:​ share​,​ key​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z 
         ​(*​ layer​:​ val​,​ layer_bits​:​ list Z​,​ q​:​ Z​,​ topDoll​:​ val​,​ topDoll_bits​:​ list Z, 
         botDoll ​:​ val​,​ botDoll_bits​:​ list Z​,​ v​:​ Z​,  
         k​:​ val​, ​ k_bits​:​ list Z​,​ r​:​ Z​,​ i​:​ val​,​ i_bits​:​ list Z, 
         j​:​ val​, ​ j_bits​:​ list Z​,​ w​:​ Z​,  
         sh​:​ share​,​ key​:​ Z​,​ size​:​ Z ​*) 
    PRE ​[​ _layer OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _q OF tint​,​ _topDoll OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _botDoll OF ​(​tptr tint ​), 
_v OF tint, 
          _k OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _r OF tint​,​ _i OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _j OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _w OF tint​,  
          _key OF tint​,​ _size OF tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ size ​<​ ​Int​.​max_signed​;  
                 size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd layer_var​);​ size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd topDoll_var​);  
                 size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd botDoll_var​);  
                 size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd k_var​);​ size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd i_var​);​ size ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd 
j_var​);  
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                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd layer_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd k_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd i_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd j_var​)) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _layer ​(​fst layer_var​);​ temp _q ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr q​));​ temp _topDoll ​(​fst 
topDoll_var​);  
                 temp _botDoll ​(​fst botDoll_var​);​ temp _v ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr v​)); 
                 temp _k ​(​fst k_var​);​ temp _r ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr r​));​ temp _i ​(​fst i_var​);  
                 temp _j ​(​fst j_var​);​ temp _w ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr w​));  
                 temp _key ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr key​));​ temp _size ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr size​)))  
          SEP ​(( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
layer_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
topDoll_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
botDoll_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd k_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
k_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd i_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
i_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd j_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
j_var​))) 
    POST ​[​tint] 
      PROP ​() 
      LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ( 
              andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
k_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr q​)​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr r​)​ ​(​Int​.​repr key​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​))) 
              ​(( ​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr v​)​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr w​)​ ​(​Int​.​repr key​)))))))) 
                ​then​ ​Int​.​repr ​1​ ​else​ ​Int​.​repr ​0​)))  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
k_var​))))​ ​(​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
i_var​))))​ ​(​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr key​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
j_var​))))​ ​(​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint size​)​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst 
botDoll_var​))).  
 
Definition​ certifyReceipt_spec ​:=  
  DECLARE _certifyReceipt ​(*​ ​long​ spec ​*) 
    WITH layer_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ topDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         botDoll_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ q_v​:​ ​(​Z ​*​ Z​),  
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         k_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ i_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​), 
         j_var​:​ ​(​val ​*​ list Z​),​ r_w​:​ ​(​Z ​*​ Z​),​ topFlag_size​:​ ​(​Z ​*​ Z​), 
         sh​:​ share​,​ topSerialKey​:​ Z​,​ botSerialKey​:​ Z​,​ topTupleKey​:​ Z​,​ botTupleKey​:​ Z 
    PRE ​[​ _topFlag OF tint​,  
          _layer OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _q OF tint​,​ _topDoll OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _botDoll OF ​(​tptr tint ​), 
_v OF tint, 
          _k OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _r OF tint​,​ _i OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _j OF ​(​tptr tint​),​ _w OF tint​, 
_size OF tint, 
          _topSerialKey OF tint​,​ _botSerialKey OF tint​,​ _topTupleKey OF tint​,​ _botTupleKey OF 
tint ] 
          PROP  ​(​readable_share sh​;​ writable_share sh​;​ ​0​ ​<=​ ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​< 
Int​.​max_signed​;  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd layer_var​);  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd topDoll_var​);  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd botDoll_var​);  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd k_var​);  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd i_var​);  
                 ​(​snd topFlag_size​)​ ​=​ ​Zlength​ ​(​snd j_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd layer_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd k_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd i_var​);  
                 ​Forall​ ​(​fun bit ​=>​ ​Int​.​min_signed ​<=​ bit ​<=​ ​Int​.​max_signed​)​ ​(​snd j_var​)) 
          LOCAL ​(​temp _layer ​(​fst layer_var​);​ temp _q ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst q_v​)));  
                 temp _topDoll ​(​fst topDoll_var​);  
                 temp _botDoll ​(​fst botDoll_var​);​ temp _v ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd q_v​))); 
                 temp _k ​(​fst k_var​);​ temp _r ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst r_w​)));​ temp _i ​(​fst 
i_var​);  
                 temp _j ​(​fst j_var​);​ temp _w ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd r_w​)));  
                 temp _topFlag ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst topFlag_size​)));  
                 temp _topSerialKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr topSerialKey​));  
                 temp _botSerialKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr botSerialKey​));  
                 temp _topTupleKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​));  
                 temp _botTupleKey ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​));  
                 temp _size ​(​Vint​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topFlag_size​))))  
          SEP ​(( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst layer_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst topDoll_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​)))​ ​(​fst botDoll_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd k_var​)))​ ​(​fst k_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd i_var​)))​ ​(​fst i_var​)); 
               ​( ​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
                ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd j_var​)))​ ​(​fst j_var​))) 
    POST ​[​tint] 
      PROP ​() 
      LOCAL ​(​temp ret_temp ​(​Vint​ ​(​if​ ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst topFlag_size​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​1​)) 
            ​then ​ ​(​if 
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd q_v​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
topSerialKey​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd k_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst r_w​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
topTupleKey​))) 
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              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd i_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd j_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​))) 
              ​(( ​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd r_w​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
topTupleKey​))))))))) 
                 ​then​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​1​)​ ​else​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​0​)) 
 
            ​else ​ ​(​if 
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd q_v​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
botSerialKey​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd k_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd layer_var​)))  
              ​(​andb ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst r_w​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
botTupleKey​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd i_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd topDoll_var​))) 
              ​(​andb ​(​foralleq ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map 
Int​.​repr ​(​snd j_var​))) 
                ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd botDoll_var​))) 
              ​(( ​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd q_v​))​ ​(​deSignInteger ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​snd r_w​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr 
botTupleKey​))))))))) 
                 ​then​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​1​)​ ​else​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​0​))))) 
      ​if ​ ​(​Int​.​eq ​(​Int​.​repr ​(​fst topFlag_size​))​ ​(​Int​.​repr ​1​)) 
             ​then  
       SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd k_var​))))​ ​( ​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))))​ ​( ​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr topTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))))​ ​( ​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst botDoll_var​))) 
             ​else  
      SEP   ​((​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd k_var​))))​ ​( ​fst k_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
layer_var​)))​ ​(​fst layer_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd i_var​))))​ ​( ​fst i_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
topDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst topDoll_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))  
               ​( ​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​(​fun i ​=>​ deSignInteger i ​(​Int​.​repr botTupleKey​))​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr 
(​snd j_var​))))​ ​( ​fst j_var​)); 
             ​(​data_at sh ​(​tarray tint ​(​snd topFlag_size​))​ ​(​map ​Vint​ ​(​map ​Int​.​repr ​(​snd 
botDoll_var​)))​ ​( ​fst botDoll_var​))).  
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Definition​ main_spec ​:= 
 DECLARE _main 
  WITH u ​:​ unit 
  PRE  ​[]​ main_pre prog u 





[1] : Staub, Julie Ann. "AN ANALYSIS OF CHAUM'S VOTER-VERIFIABLE ELECTION 
SCHEME." Thesis. University of Maryland, 2005. Web 
[2]:  Appel, A. W, Verified software toolchain. In ESOP ’11: Proceedings of the 20th European 
Conference on Programming Languages and Systems, 2011.  
[3] : Appel, A.W., "Verification of a Cryptographic Primitive: SHA-256", ACM Transactions on 
Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS), 2015. 
[4]: Sandrine Blazy, Zaynah Dargaye, and Xavier Leroy. Formal verification of a C compiler 
front-end. In Symp. on Formal Methods, pages 460–475, 2006 
[5]: D. Chaum. Presentation: Secret-Ballot Receipts: True Voter-Verifiable Elections. DIMACS 
Workshop on Electronic Voting, 2004. Available at 
https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/voting/papers/Chaum-SecretBallotReceiptsTrueVoterVerifiable
Elections.pdf 
[6]. Appel, Andrew W. ​Program Logics for Certified Compilers​. New York, NY: Cambridge UP, 
2014. ​Verified Software Toolchain​. Princeton University, 27 July 2016. Web. 18 May 2017. 
http://vst.cs.princeton.edu/download/VC.pdf 
[7].  Pierce, Benjamin C. "Software Foundations." ​Software Foundations​. University of 
Pennsylvania, Spring 2017. Web. 18 May 2017. 
http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~bcpierce/sf/current/index.html 
[8]. ​VITA Security Assessment of WINVote Voting Equipment 
http://www.elections.virginia.gov/WebDocs/VotingEquipReport/WINVote-final.pdf 
57 
[9]. ​Bruce, Schneier. "The Problem with Electronic Voting Machines." ​Blog​. N.p., 10 Nov. 2004. 
Web. 18 May 2017. ​https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html 
[10]. ​Horwitz, Sari. "More than 30 States Offer Online Voting, but Experts Warn It Isn’t Secure." ​The 
Washington Post​. WP Company, 17 May 2016. Web. 18 May 2017. 
[11]. ​Wolchok, Scott, Eric Wustrow, Dawn Isabel, and Alex J. Halderman. "Attacking the 
Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System." ​Financial Cryptography and Data Security Lecture Notes 
in Computer Science​ (2012): 114-28. Feb. 2012. Web. 18 May 2017. 
[12]. ​Syal, Rajeev. "John Bercow Calls for Online Voting in 2020 General Election." ​The Guardian​. 
Guardian News and Media, 26 Jan. 2015. Web. 18 May 2017. 
[13]. M. Naor and A. Shamir, “Visual Cryptography,” Proc. Advances in Cryptology (Eurocrypt 
94), A. De Santis, ed., LNCS 950, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 1–12. 
[14]. ​Stajano, Frank. ​Visual Cryptography Kit​. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 May 2017. 
[15]. ​Ateniese, Giuseppe, Carlo Blundo, Alfredo De Santis, and Douglas R. Stinson. "Extended 
Capabilities for Visual Cryptography." ​Extended Capabilities for Visual Cryptography - ScienceDirect​. 
N.p., 6 Jan. 2001. Web. 18 May 2017. 
[16]. B. Lee and K. Kim. Receipt-free Electronic Voting Scheme with a Tamper- 
Resistent Randomizer. In ICISC `02, pgs. 405-422, 2002. 
[17]. ​Necula, George C., and Peter Lee. "Proof-Carrying Code." (n.d.): n. pag. Nov. 1996. Web. 18 
May 2017. ​http://www.utdallas.edu/~kxh060100/Papers/necula96.pdf 


